ITEME: Image Texts from Early Modern England
I had some conversations today that encouraged me to start compiling my notes into a spreadsheet. I also decided to build a form on top in order to ease the strain of entry.
Reuses: 14075 , 14075.5 , 14076 , 1407435.35 Digges, Leonard, the Elder. A prognostication of right good effect, fructfully augmented. 4o. T. Gemini. 1555. HN. Bos.clxvi. ...
- Reuses: 6849.8 , 6850.3 , 6850.5 , 6850.6 , 6275 , 6850.7 , 6851 , 6276 , 6851.2 , 5160
Sir Thomas Smith also a Protestant and a Statesman, in his Commonwelth of England, putting the question whether it be lawfull to rise against a Tyrant, answers that the vulgar judge of it according to the event, and the lerned according to the purpose of them that do it.Dartmouth also has this note:
Sir Thomas Smith. Milton read and transcribed into his Commonplace Book (Complete Prose Works 1.455-56) passages from Sir Thomas Smith's De Republica Anglorum (1583).In the 1635 octavo version of Smith (BL shelfmark 8005.a.38.) specifically has this quote early on, between the the recto and verso of B4 (pages 7 and 8):
CHAP. V. of the queĹżtion of what is right and iuĹżt
in a Common-wealth
SO when the Common-wealth isIt's interesting that Milton deliberately under-reads his source. He is correct to say that Smith distinguishes the common causes of rebellion, based on events, and the learned causes of rebellion, based on principle, but he leaves out the second learned cause: "the eĹżtate of the time when preĹżent." I can't say why Milton would omit this. Maybe Charles' reign could be assumed to be sufficiently tumultuous, or maybe that very assumption would be to contentious for Milton to defend. I think this is an open question.
euill gouerned by an euill Ruler
and vniust (as in the three laĹżt named
which be rather a ſickneſſe of the po-
litick body, than perfect and good
EĹżtates) if the Lawes bee made, as
moĹżt like they be alwayes, to main-
taine that EĹżtate: the queĹżtion re-
mayneth, whether the obedience of
them to be iuĹżt, and the diĹżobedience
wrong? the profit and conĹżeruation
of that EĹżtate, Right and IuĹżtice, or
the diſſolution? and whether a good
and upright man, and louer of his
Country ought to maintaine and o-
bey them, or to Ĺżeek by all meanes to [catchword abo-]
aboliĹżh them? which great & haugh-
tie courages haue often attempted: as
Dion to riĹże vp againĹżt DionyĹżius;
ThraĹżibius againĹżt the 30. Tyrants
Brutus and Caſſius againſt Cæſar,
which hath bin cauĹże of many com-
motions in Common-wealths: wher-
of the iudgement of the common
people is according to the euent and
ſucceſſe of them which be learned ac-
cording of them to the purpoĹże of the doers,
and the eĹżtate of the time then pre-
Ĺżent. Certain it is, that it is alwayes
a doubtfull and hazardous matter to
meddle with the changing of Lawes
and Gouernment, or to diĹżobey the
orders of the Rule or Gouernment
which a man doth find alreadie eĹżta-
bliĹżhed.
The engraved frontispiece shows a signature by William Marshall, Sculps. I remember him from Heraclitus Dream, Catholick Gamesters, etc. It features two cherubim with horns holding a portrait of Charles, framed by palms. Below are two emblematical women. On the left, a sword-carrying, scale-holding, clasically-dressed woman with the sun in her hair; on the right, a ship-holding, collared but barefoot woman with a moon in her hair. If I had to guess, I'd describe them as Justice and Commerce. Below them is a map of Britain from Cornwall to the lowlands, featuring mountains throughout. Curiously, the map of Britain is aligned with west to the north, so that the Isle of Man takes an oversized and central position. Beside Man is another, longer island of seemingly fictional origin.
In his annotations of Greek poetry, Milton focuses his attention on the text, and his studies rarely pass beyond the translation, scholia, and commentary in the volume before him. Twelve of Milton's thirty-seven Aratus notes, it is true, derive from collations of his Morel edition with the de Grabiano and Stephanus texts, and three others come "ex aliis editionibus," from Stephanus, Thesaurus Grecae Linguae, and perhaps from Grotius, Syntagma Arateorum; but in these fifteen instances, Milton's interest is in text rather than commentary--in finding the best or an equally good alternative reading; and from this purpose he varies only twice: once to quote Ovid's tribute to Aratus, and once to give a parallel from Lucretius. ... In contrast, the Pindar annotator ranges freely beyond his volume. (80)So what's the point of looking at a book of Pindar with reference to Milton? I can still respond to past scholars, or I can strike out in a new direction. If tradition is correct to associate Milton with the Saumur Pindar, then the evidence therein can provide insight to Milton's reading practices. I don't want to attribute any manuscript annotations to Milton, but I can still refer to the print. That is, the Saumur Pindar contains an elaborate polyglot apparatus of Latin and Greek in three co-ordinated columns. This suggests a practice of reading--though, again, this suggestion is not grounded in manuscript notes or direct reference--that young Milton's annotations appeared in conversation with three other columns of notes.
“Rare” is such an quizzical descriptor, a blatant contradiction of the very nature of digital culture. Rarity describes a state of scarcity, and as we enter a proto-post-scarcity economy, digital stuff defies such shortages.
Things are no longer rare; they are either popular or unpopular.
Rarity itself has become very rare.Is it? Or is this surprising claim only an accident of the multiple senses of "rarity"?
Can you think of a media object — anything that can be digitally reproduced — that is rare in our times?This challenge leaves out the entire archives of "Rare Books" at my university and everywhere. Of course material objects can still be rare. In fact, the challenge is rigged from the start. It begins with the set of objects that are "digitally reproduced," meaning that there are at least two digital copies. And following from the first complaint, I can define any number as "big" or "small," so I hereby declare two copies (implicit in the definition of "digitally reproduced") to be "not rare." So the challenge amounts to a bare assertion: "Can you think of a X object--anything that does X--that is not X?"
I speak of the difference between a relation and a function. A relation is something that relates a certain kind of object to some number of others (zero, one, two, etc). A function, on the other hand, is a special kind of relation that links each such object to exactly one thing. Suppose we are talking about people. Mother of and father of are functions, because every person has exactly one (biological) mother and exactly one father. But son of and daughter of are relations, because parents might have any number of sons and daughters. Functions give a unique output; relations can give any number of outputs.What I'm proposing is that Sorgatz implicitly defines "rare" as a function of "common" or "popular." Ie, All that which is not common is rare, and vice-versa. Evidently, there's a number line posted in Sorgatz's office, and the side closer to 0 is marked "rare" and the side closer to 2.3 million is marked "common." But I propose instead that one object can be rare in relation to other things.
Because the GA had no way to reject force, over time it fell to force. Proposals won by intimidation; bullies carried the day. What began as a way to let people reform and remake themselves had no mechanism for dealing with them when they didn’t. It had no way to deal with parasites and predators. It became a diseased process, pushing out the weak and quiet it had meant to enfranchise until it finally collapsed when nothing was left but predators trying to rip out each other’s throats.In a revealing discussion on a well-known bbs , some of the makers of Loomio interweave their own history with the rhetorical concerns of Occupy:
Hey Hugh - I'm one of the folks working on Loomio too.
I appreciate that the maker RichDecibels acknowledges some of the principle paradoxes of inclusion: does inclusion itself include some or all parts of exclusion? Are there mutually exclusive constituencies? The solution of Loomio is simply: put it to a vote. If you find yourself wrangling mutually exclusive constituencies, then mandate some form of interaction that will force them to express the strength of their preferences.In some respects, defining "inclusive" is the hardest question in the world. At Occupy we tried to say "we include everyone". It was a traumatic lesson to learn that is actually an impossible aim: when you include anyone, you include people who's behaviour excludes others.So if you can't include everyone, how do you draw the boundary?At Occupy the impossibility of that question proved fatal: almost all of the camps that were lucky enough to avoid the violent state suppression of jackbooted thugs eventually succumbed to that paradox.I believe we can get closer to a solution if we reframe the question though. Instead of saying "let's include everyone", what happens if we say "let's include everyone that is affected by this decision"?You can add more nuance to that principle and agree that a person's influence over a decision is in proportion to the degree to which it affects them.If you can agree a set of interaction protocols that are a prerequisite to participation, and some high-level nonspecific aims, then you can actually start making progress.Once you have that unifying banner agreed, you can keep decisions action-focussed. Personally, collective decision-making is infinitely more appealing to me when it is used to plan action, rather than trying to agree abstract theory!